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Abstract
Given the increasing frequency and severity of cyber
attacks on information systems of all kinds, there is interest in rationalized approaches for selecting the
“best” set of cybersecurity mitigations. However,
what is best for one target environment is not necessarily best for another. This paper examines an approach to selection that uses a set of weighted criteria,
where the security engineer sets the weights based on
organizational priorities and constraints. The approach is based on a capability-based representation
for cybersecurity mitigations. The paper discusses a
group of artifacts that compose the approach through
the lens of Design Science research and reports performance results of an instantiation artifact.

1. Introduction
Cyber systems are ubiquitous across society. Breaches
to cyber systems continue to be front-page news [1],
and, despite more than a decade of heightened focus
on cybersecurity, cyber threats continue to evolve and
grow [2]–[4]. When threats are insufficiently or incorrectly mitigated based on the anticipated threat, exposure remains. Conversely, over-protection wastes resources and can affect system performance; hence, indiscriminate application of mitigations is ill-advised.
A key method for prioritizing mitigations is to assess
the business/mission risks that an organization faces
due to the anticipated cyber threat. A number of risk
assessment methods are available (e.g., [5]–[12]) that
can assist system security engineers (SSEs) in identifying risks in a particular environment. In addition to
risk, the SSE must also consider other criteria when
making mitigation decisions. Deciding upon,
weighting, and quantifying such criteria is a challenge.
These decisions are complex, inexact, and involve
multiple stakeholders with diverse interests. Moreover, there is no “one size fits all” approach because, for
example, information environments, business dependence on those environments, relevant cyber threats,
risk tolerance levels, and security budgets vary from
one organization to the next [13].
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The SSE faces an additional challenge when considering mitigation options: deciding upon those that best
balance often-competing criteria (e.g., mitigation cost
vs. trustworthiness vs. effectiveness). Such mitigation
combinations are often discussed in the context of “Pareto-efficient” solutions. Pareto efficiency is “a state
of allocation of resources [e.g., defensive cyber solutions that mitigate threats in this context] from which
it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion
worse off” [14].
The contribution of this paper is an approach to mitigation selection containing elements of multi-criteria
decision-making [15] that recommends a candidate set
of defensive solutions using criteria and associated
weightings set by the SSE. Primary initial goals are
three-fold: (1) identify an approach that we would find
useful as practitioners of cybersecurity risk and mitigation analysis, (2) ensure that the approach is compatible with cybersecurity threats and mitigations
modeled as capabilities, and (3) identify a practical
middle ground between completely ad hoc mitigation
selection approaches on the one hand, and approaches
whose computational complexity requires the use of
sophisticated heuristic algorithms on the other.
The paper is organized as follows: after reviewing related work, we summarize the capability-based representation for cyber threats and defenses against those
threats. Next, we use Design Science principles to describe and analyze the artifacts that make up our approach. The description includes a discussion of the
underlying object model, associated methods, and an
instantiation of the model and methods. Lastly, we
evaluate the artifacts with a focus on execution performance for the instantiation, discuss results, and conclude with lessons learned and ideas for future work.

2. Related Work
In practice, it is unrealistic to apply all possible mitigations (also sometimes called security controls) to
every threat, due to budget and time pressures, feasi-
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bility, and other organizational concerns. Several researchers have approached the problem of optimizing
mitigation selections, that is, taking a longer list of
possible mitigations and down-selecting to a shorter
list based on some defined criteria or goals. There are
two interesting dimensions to this area, the criteria
themselves and the analysis methods.
Dor and Elovici [16] describe a model of information
security investment decision-making comprised of
concepts that they derive from a grounded theory
study. The authors identify great differences in the
ways organizations make these decisions influenced
by a multitude of criteria, including policy, competitive advantage, financial considerations, quality, compliance, customer expectations, and strategy.
A review of the literature confirms the wide variety of
criteria considered when selecting a security control
portfolio for a particular situation, including overarching organizational concerns, attributes of specific assets in the environment, anticipated threats, and properties of controls. We summarize these criteria below:
Organizational




Asset




Business impact/disruption, anticipated loss,
profit reduction, fines, reputation, decline in
stock price, damage [17]–[23]
Risk tolerance [12], [19], [24]; Budget [19]
Legal and regulatory [22]
Self-imposed constraints [22]
Importance/value [13], [24]–[27]
Assessed risk [12], [24]
Probability of breach, event, or successful attack [13], [24], [26], [28], [29]

Threat
 Anticipated [25], [27], [30], [31]
 Most significant [25]
 Residual risk [23], [32]; Incident data [17]
Control








Cost, general [12], [13], [30], [32], [18],
[20]–[23], [26]–[28]
Purchase/setup [17], [24], [25], [33]–[35]
Number of controls as a proxy for cost [36]
Difficulty of implementation [25]
Operation, training, and maintenance cost
[17], [24], [25], [33], [35]
Efficiency, effectiveness, performance, degree or number of threats addressed [12],
[17], [20], [25], [28], [33], [34]
Degree of implementation [30]







Alignment with applicable standards, laws,
regulations [33], [34]
Availability [12]
Number of benefits accessed [37]
Controls which, when applied in combination, provide more benefit than the sum of
their individual benefits [37]
Stakeholder preference [31]

Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) [15], also
known as multiple-criteria decision analysis (MCDA),
is widely applied to security portfolio selection [12],
[19], [22], [24], [28], [29], [36], [38]. MCDM is a discipline for evaluating multiple conflicting criteria. It is
used to analyze problems where there are some
measures of costs and benefits that can be traded off to
arrive at the best solution under the given constraints.
Researchers investigate a number of MCDM techniques for this problem, some of which include or are
based on fuzzy set theory [34], multi-attribute utility
theory (i.e., value functions, knapsack strategy) [18],
[27], [30], [37], evolutionary multi-objective optimization (EMO) also known as genetic algorithms [13],
[20], [23], [26], [32], [35], analytic hierarchy process
(AHP) [31], grey relational analysis (GRA) [25], simple additive weighting (SAW) [17], the technique for
order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) [25], and preference ranking organization method
for enrichment evaluation (PROMETHEE) [33].
Several authors apply game theory to security portfolio selection in combination with MCDM techniques.
Fielder et al. [30] employs a pure game theoretic approach in a single massive two-person non-cooperative zero-sum static game where the defender (person
in charge of choosing defenses) competes against an
attacker who chooses among various attack targets.
The Nash equilibrium of the game represents the best
defensive portfolio. Recognizing that the organization
may not have sufficient budget to implement the equilibrium of the pure game, the authors also discuss a
hybrid approach combining game theory with a knapsack strategy. Panaousis, et al. [27] model the cybersecurity posture of an organization and then present a
series of non-cooperative control-games where each
game is between the defender (a single control) and
the attacker. The Nash equilibria of the games are derived in consideration of organizational preferences
such as costs, anticipated threats, and asset importance. A knapsack approach is subsequently used
to optimize investment in security controls within the
organization’s budget. Finally, Wang and Zhu [21]
used evolutionary game theory to investigate longterm cybersecurity investment strategies finding that
firms will invest as long as either the cost to invest is
low or the cost of a breach is high.
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3. Capability-Based Representation
This paper examines defensive solution selection in
the context of a capability-based representation for
cyber threats and mitigations to those threats
[5][39][40]. We define a capability as the ability to
contribute in some way to the attack or defense of a
target system and a defensive solution as a coordinated
set of defensive capabilities. In this approach, the focus is on (1) the underlying offensive capabilities that
cyber attackers use to compose attacks and (2) the defensive capabilities composed into defensive solutions
that mitigate those offensive capabilities. See the Unified Modeling Language (UML) model [41] in Figure
1 for the basic entities and relationships.

for Information Systems Research” [43]. Peffers presents a series of steps for artifacts evaluation, specifically: (1) identify the problem and show its importance, (2) define objectives of a solution, (3) design
and develop the artifact, (4) demonstrate the artifact in
a suitable context, (5) evaluate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the artifact, and (6) communicate results.
The introduction covered steps 1-2. This section lays
artifact design, and we demonstrate and evaluate the
artifacts in upcoming sections. Lastly, this paper contributes to the communication requirement.

Model. The UML model in Figure 2 builds on Figure
1 and illustrates an object model used in our experimental prototype implementation.

Figure 1: Capability-Based Representation
An example of an offensive capability is “Inject
stealthy software implants” and an example of a related defensive capability is “Detect and block most
stealthy implants via software whitelisting.”
The capability-based approach is in contrast to the historically more common attack-centric approach used
in cybersecurity analysis that requires one to enumerate and analyze attack possibilities. We find capability-based analysis more tractable than attack and vulnerability enumeration [42] and justify the approach
on the hypothesis that the more one mitigates offensive capabilities possessed by the anticipated adversary, the more difficult it is for the adversary to compose viable attacks from remaining, unmitigated capabilities.

4. Artifacts
This section discusses the artifacts that compose our
approach. The artifacts include (1) a model, (2) methods that employ the model to recommend the best potential defensive solutions subject to constraints, and
(3) an experimental instantiation (1) and (2).
We examine the artifacts in the context of Design Science (DS) principles as articulated by Peffers, et al., in
the paper “A Design Science Research Methodology
Figure 2: UML Model
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Brief descriptions of the classes in Figure 2 appear in
Table 1.
Table 1: Class Descriptions

Class
Catalog

Environment (E)
Asset
Instance
(AI)
Assigned
Mitigation
AssetType
(AT)
Defensive
Solution
(DS)
Defensive
Capability
(DC)
Fitness
Criteria
Member
Mitigation

Description
A reusable knowledge management
repository for capturing the information in Figure 1.
The asset instances and existing mitigations mapped to them that make up
the target environment to be analyzed.
An instance of an asset in the target
cyber environment. Each asset has a
corresponding asset type found in the
Catalog.
A mapping of a defensive capability
from the Catalog to an asset instance
in the environment.
The type of an asset. Offensive capabilities map to the asset types they
threaten.
A collection of defensive capabilities
that together can mitigate the effects
of one or more offensive capabilities.
The ability to contribute to the mitigation of an offensive capability.
The set of user-selected weights for
the fitness criteria.
A mapping of a defensive capability
to a given defensive solution.
The mapping of a given defensive solution to an offensive capability that it
mitigates.

Offensive
Capability
(OC)

The ability to contribute to the attack
of an asset in some way.

Threatens

A mapping of an offensive capability
to a given asset type.

Tradespace
The main program.
Simulator

Selection Method. This section uses the abbreviations for classes introduced above to discuss the selection method, called findBestSolutions. The method
uses the model given in Figure 2 and an accessory fitness function that scores criteria introduced below.

Evaluation Criteria. To evaluate the fitness of DSs
for their role in potentially mitigating OCs, the method
employs a set of evaluation criteria shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Defensive Solution Evaluation Criteria
Criterion

Description

The severity of an offensive capability. Severity
could be derived, for exSeverity ample, from CVSS
scores stored in the National Vulnerability Database [44].
How effective a DS is
believed to be. A value
Effecof 0.0 means fully ineftiveness
fective; 1.0 means fully
effective.
How trustworthy a
given DS is believed to
be. A DS might be conAssur- sidered more trustworthy, for example, if it
ance
has been rigorously
tested by an independent
testing laboratory [45].
An estimate of the total
cost of the DS. Cost includes multiple components, such as cost to acCost
quire, integrate, operate,
and train users, as applicable.
Estimated time to inteTime
grate the DS.
Impact to mission/busiImpact ness performance from
use of the DS.
How much of a given
DS is already impleReuse
mented in the environment for a given asset.
The ratio of the number
of offensive capabilities
mapped to asset inApstances in the target enplicabilvironment that the DS
ity
can mitigate to the highest number of any DS
mapped.

Max

Mapping



OC



DS to
OC
mapping



DS

--

DS

--

DS

--

DS



DS
mapped
to AI in
E



DS
mapped
to E

Consistent with MCDM, we normalize the range of
each criterion to values between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive.
Some criteria, such as cost, time, and reuse, use an ordinal Likert scale mapped to this range. At least initially, subject matter experts (SMEs) set the values for
the first six criteria. The findBestSolutions method
computes the last two criteria based on E. The long-
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term goal is to calibrate SME-determined values with
empirical reality as such data becomes available.

𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝐴𝐼𝑒 , 𝑂𝐶, 𝐷𝑆) =
⋁

The Max column in Table 2 indicates whether we wish
to maximize (checkmark present) or minimize
(checkmark absent) the corresponding criterion. For
example, we wish to maximize use of defensive solutions that more effectively address more severe offensive capabilities, whereas we wish to minimize cost,
time, and mission impact. The Mapping column in Table 2 indicates the mapping of a criterion into the
model in Figure 2. For example, severity is with respect to the effects of an offensive capability (OC) and
effectiveness is with respect to the mapping of a defensive solution (DS) to an offensive capability (OC).
We selected the criteria in Table 2 based on a review
of the literature and on requirements that stakeholders
commonly articulate in our experience. Note that the
risk score for each asset in the target environment is
not included as a criterion in Table 2 because we use
the risk score to filter or down-select the asset instances in the target environment for consideration of
mitigations in the first place. That is, the findBestSolutions method only considers the ‘riskiest’ assets
based on a SSE-supplied level of risk tolerance.

⋁

⋁

𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠)

𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝐼𝑒 𝑜𝑐 ∈ 𝑂𝐶𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑎𝑖) 𝑑𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑐

(2)
Equation (2) considers each asset instance, ai, in the
set of assets instances, AI, in the target environment,
e. For each ai, it considers each offensive capability
from the set of offensive capabilities, OC, mapped to
the asset type, AT, corresponding to the ai. Then for
each defensive solution mapped to oc, it applies the
fitness function, ff, from equation (1) to ds (in the context of oc and ai).
Instantiation. We call our instantiation of the model
and methods described above TradespaceSimulator.
To allow us to assess performance, the simulator generates a synthetic sample catalog and a sample target
environment using a configurable set of size parameters. Example output from the simulator appears in
Figures 3, 4, and 5. Figure 3 is sample output from the
findBestSolutions method.

Fitness Function. The fitness function, ff, computes a
fitness score over the criteria from Table 2 and implements equation (1).

𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠) =
∑𝑛𝑖=1 |𝑚𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠)| ∙ 𝑓𝑤𝑖 (1)
Elements of equation (1) are as follows:
 𝑓𝑓 returns a fitness score for a given defensive solution, ds, mapped to a particular offensive capability, oc that, in turn, is mapped to a particular
asset instance, ai, in the target environment under
consideration. ai maps to a particular AT.
 𝑛 is the number of criteria, 8 in this case.
 𝑓𝑖 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠) is the value of the ith criterion in the
context of ai, oc, and ds; 0.0 ≤ value ≤ 1.0.
 𝑓𝑤𝑖 is the weight for the given criterion. The SSE
assigns a weight based on relative importance of
the criterion in the context of the target environment. Criterion weights are relative to one another
and must be non-negative (𝑓𝑤𝑖 𝜖 ℤ≥ ).
 𝑚𝑓𝑖 follows the Max column in Table 2. If the
goal is to maximize the given criterion, then 𝑚𝑓𝑖
is set to 0.0; otherwise, 𝑚𝑓𝑖 is set to 1.0.

Figure 3: Sample output from findBestSolutions
In the Figure 3 sample, the output is for asset instance,
AI0, which is of type AT3. The offensive capability
threat under consideration is OC4, which has a severity of 0.6. OC4 has seven candidate defensive solutions, each with a fitness score computed by ff. For example, defensive solution DS36 has fitness score of
5.67, which is the sum of the weighted criterion values
given in column 5 of Table 3.
Table 3: DS36 score derivation

findBestSolutions. findBestSolutions is an implementation of equation (2) and finds the ‘best’ solutions
for the given criteria and associated weightings.
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Figure 4 shows a small sampling of the best solutions
resulting from application of the findBestSolutions
method and the asset instances to which they apply.

5. Evaluation and Discussion
This section evaluates the artifacts introduced above.
Model. While the object model is suitable for representing the problem space of interest in this paper, one
could enhance the model for broader use, e.g., organizing asset types into a taxonomy to better represent
and organize asset type possibilities and expanding the
model to include named asset groupings.

Figure 4: ‘Best’ solutions mapped to asset instances
This output provides information for the SSE to consider when making mitigation decisions. To simplify
the output, the method does not show the offensive capabilities mitigated by each defensive solution (this information appears elsewhere, such as in Figure 3).
Note that the method computes fitness for all defensive solutions mapped to a given threat/asset instance
combination, but retains only the highest scoring defensive solution. The collection of highest scoring solutions is then the recommended architecture.
To go along with the output in Figure 4, the simulator
performs additional bookkeeping during execution of
findBestSolutions to allow it to later provide an ‘aggregate’ view of each defensive solution, a sampling
of which appears in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Aggregate Score View
For example, the fifth line of the sample output in Figure 5 shows that defensive solution DS62 has an aggregate score of 265.4, which is the sum of the solution’s fitness scores for all the places that it applies in
E, which is 32 unique combinations of asset instances
and offensive capabilities. The output also shows that
DS62 was the ‘best’ solution in 30 of those cases, giving it an overall ‘best’ percentage of 93.8%. If we scale
the aggregate score of 265.4 by this percentage, the adjusted aggregate score is 248.8.
In combination, figures 4 and 5 provide a local and
global view, allowing the SSE to see defensive solutions asset-by-asset, threat-by-threat, but also the overall value of defensive solutions as they pertain to the
target environment as a whole.

Methods. The fitness function, ff, and findBestSolutions method artifacts together select the ‘best’ solution based on a given set of weighted criteria. The authors chose to relate the criteria in a linear combination
instead of arranging criteria into a more general polynomial equation, as a linear combination produced results that we considered to be useful for informing decisions. However, the SSE is free to assign weights
along a non-linear scale, if desired.
While the set of criteria chosen in this approach has
utility to the authors, we recognize that obtaining values for certain criteria can be a challenge. The use of
ordinal scale data that SMEs assign based on their general knowledge partially ameliorates this problem, but
ultimately, we would like to introduce, for example,
actual cost estimates for the cost attributes associated
with defensive capabilities and solutions.
The findBestSolutions method proceeds asset instance
by asset instance, considering offensive capabilities
that each instance faces. The method includes a more
global view as well by computing the applicability criterion value. In addition, and as discussed in the Instantiation section above, the simulator sums up fitness scores for each applicable offensive solution
score from the catalog and scales the result based on
the percentage of time the solution had the best score.
Instantiation. We were interested in performance
characteristics of the Java-based instantiation under
increasing sizes of catalog and target environment.
Table 4: Variables in Sample Output
Variable
Trial
Sec
E-AI
E-Mit
C-OC
C-DS
C-DC
C-AT
C-Mit
C-Mem

Description
Trial number (1 to 15)
Time to generate solutions in seconds
Environment: asset instances
Environment: existing mitigations
Catalog: offensive capabilities
Catalog: defensive solutions
Catalog: defensive capabilities
Catalog: asset types
Catalog: mapped mitigations
Catalog: solution members (a member is a
defensive capability)
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With this in mind, we ran 15 trials on a Windows 10
Dell Latitude E5570 laptop with 15 GB of memory
and an Intel Core i7-6820 processor. Table 4 describes
the variables of interest in a run of the simulator. Table
5 shows the values of each of the variables tracked for
each trial execution. Each successive trial used a larger
total generated data set for both the Environment (Eprefixed variables) and Catalog (C-prefixed variables). For example, trial 2 had an environment consisting of 70 asset instances and 208 mitigations.
Table 5: Trials and associated data per trial

The second column shows the total time in seconds
that the findBestSolutions method took to run, which
includes calls to the ff method.
As Figure 6 shows, time increases nearly linearly for
the catalog and environment sizes that we sampled.
We expect non-linear performance in the long run (for
very large catalogs and target environments for analysis) based on the three nested loops of the implementation of equation (2). That said, the catalog and environment sizes in trial #15 are larger than any catalog
or target environment we have ever evaluated in our
work to date assessing real-world systems.

(e.g., a given budget) or “do not fall below” (e.g., a
given level of trustworthiness) values for selected criterion. Other limitations are: the approach does not
take into consideration the uncertainty of values for
criteria and the approach offers no special assistance
for conducting sensitivity analysis beyond manual reexecutions that use revised weightings.

6. Conclusions and Future Work
We used Design Science principles in our conception
and evaluation of an approach to mitigation selection
based on a capability representation for offensive and
defensive abilities possessed by attackers and defenders, respectively. The approach uses a set of weighted
criteria that are customizable by the SSE based on organizational priorities and constraints. We learned that
the approach yielded acceptable performance results
for the size of target environments that we commonly
see. We also found that we could readily generalize the
results to a more global view, specifically a defensive
solution’s overall contribution to a target environment.
Future work possibilities include: (1) consider potentially augmenting the approach with more sophisticated methods (e.g., genetic algorithms, linear programming) that can help with the first limitation listed
earlier; (2) formally assess the utility of the artifacts to
working SSEs, including a survey of SSEs about the
solution selection criteria they think are, on average,
the most useful and how they would set default
weights for those criteria; (3) explore ways to incorporate uncertainty and sensitivity analysis into the approach; (4) apply the artifacts to non-synthetic data
sets; (5) compare SSE-selected mitigations to that of
the simulator for the same target system and investigate to understand the differences in outcomes; (6) incorporate additional criteria, such as the ability to prefer or avoid certain vendor implementations of given
defensive solutions/capabilities and criteria described
in the related work section, such as favoring solutions
that align to certain standards; and (7) break out the
cost criteria into explicit sub-criteria so they can be receive separate weights.
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Figure 6: Execution time in seconds per run
The overall approach has certain limitations. For example, one cannot specify “do not exceed” values
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